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Chief Administrator or Political ‘Moderator’?: Dumbarton Oaks, the Secretary-
General and the Korean War 
 
Seventy-five years after representatives of the ‘Big Four’ – the United States, the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China – met at Dumbarton Oaks on the 
outskirts of Washington, DC, to discuss the foundation of a new international organization, 
the secretary-general is widely seen as the United Nations’ (UN) de facto figurehead. Still, it 
remains unclear whether the wartime allies envisaged such a political character for this office 
since, in the interim, each secretary-general has acted according to his interpretation of his 
powers.
1
 By examining the discussions that took place on this issue before, during and 
immediately after the Dumbarton Oaks conference this article will seek to assess exactly 
what powers the UN founders intended for the secretary-general. What is clear –  despite the 
very limited nature of the talks that took place in August 1944 on this issue – is the apparent 
agreement that the secretary-general of the new international organisation should be more 
proactive in maintaining international peace and security than his purely administrative 
League of Nations’ predecessor.   
Furthermore, the secretary-general’s specific functions remained largely unarticulated 
even after the establishment of the UN. As a result, the first officeholder, the wartime 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Trygve Lie, sought to test the political powers of his 
office. Lie had demonstrated his activism on a number of occasions between 1946 and 1950. 
His most controversial intervention, however, occurred following the outbreak of the Korean 
War when the UN’s capacity to maintain international peace and security was tested fully for 
the first time. Given the Cold War friction generated over Lie’s actions it is essential to 
question whether the Secretary-General transgressed the role the UN founders had intended 
for his office. This article will argue that Lie did test the parameters of his office but at no 
time breached these limits. He thus set a number of important precedents that helped shape 
the secretary-general’s distinctly political character for his successors and ensured that each 
subsequent office-holder would be the symbol of the world organisation. 
It should be noted here, moreover, that Lie’s role in shaping the office of the 
secretary-general has been largely overshadowed by that of his successor, the Swedish 
diplomat Dag Hammarskjold, whose more intellectual, subtle and eloquent approach has, 
subsequent to his untimely death in an air crash in the service of the UN during the Congo 
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crisis, been near-universally praised. As such, Hammarskjold has attracted far more scholarly 
attention than Lie. That Hammarskjold re-imagined the political role of the secretary-general 
was articulated most strongly by Sir Brian Urquhart
2
 – Hammarskjold’s former Secretariat 
colleague turned biographer – and has been oft-repeated, including recently by Anne Orford.
3
 
Hammarskjold himself also sought much more than his predecessor to outline the powers of 
secretary-general.
4
 Undeniably, therefore, Hammarskjold merits the plaudits he has received. 
Yet this article demonstrates that Lie’s actions, especially during the Korean War, laid the 
necessary foundations for the Swede to pursue an even more political approach to the office 
of the secretary-general.   
Preparations for a world organisation to succeed the discredited League of Nations 
began in earnest in 1942 following the signing of the Declaration by the United Nations. 
Policy-makers within the US Department of State took the lead in this process with their 
British, Russian and Chinese counterparts preoccupied with the more immediate issue of 
defeating the Axis powers. Inevitably, the focus of attention in Washington was on how this 
new organisation could avoid the failings of its predecessor and prevent the outbreak of 
future conflict. Questions regarding the character of the staff of the new organisation, 
therefore, were considered low priority. During 1943, nonetheless, serious concerns were 
raised over establishing a non-political chief administrator akin to the League’s secretary-
general. 
 Ruth Russell’s book remains easily the best account of the State Department’s 
deliberations on this issue.
5
 In this work, Russell outlines the three separate position papers 
created within the State Department. In the first paper, the Draft Constitution of International 
Organization, produced on 14 July 1943, the ‘general-secretary’ was to act as the non-voting 
chairman of the Executive Council and be able to summon meetings. More significantly, the 
general-secretary was also permitted to request parties ‘to desist from any action which 
would further aggravate the situation’ if a real or potential breach of the peace occurred. This 
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paper, however, was uncertain whether the post-holder should be someone of high 
international reputation or a national of a smaller country who would likely be more 
impartial. Either way it was expected that the individual would focus on the chairmanship of 
the Executive Council and delegate the less important administrative aspects. The second 
paper, the Staff Charter of the United Nations, produced on 14 August 1943, granted the 
‘director-general’ very similar political powers. In fact, the only significant difference from 
the Draft Constitution was that this paper emphatically stated that the office should be held 
by a man of international stature. In both papers, however, details regarding the post’s 
political character were limited. 
The third paper, the Tentative Proposals for a General International Organisation, was 
published on 18 July 1944 after much fraught debate in the State Department. Serious 
rethinking of this question had been triggered in December 1943 by US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s suggestion that a ‘moderator’ be appointed. Roosevelt envisaged a man of great 
personal reputation who could mediate and settle all international differences or disputes 
amicably and judiciously. Nevertheless, the Informal Political Agenda Group appointed to 
consider the President’s proposal was deeply divided. Its members assumed Roosevelt 
desired an individual who would preside over the Executive Council and actively participate 
in its deliberations. A number of State Department officials supported this concept since a 
figure of high reputation responsible only to the new organisation would be able to represent 
the ‘general interests’ of the global community. Still, other members of the group argued that 
the power and authority of the Executive Council was derived from the member states and no 
individual had a function there.  
Moreover, questions were asked over the practicalities of having an elder statesman 
serve as the ‘president’ of the new organisation.
6
 To start with, uncertainty existed over 
whether the office-holder should attend all Executive Council meetings or perform more of a 
symbolic role, only being present at great occasions. If the latter, some suggested that he also 
act as the presiding officer of the General Assembly which only met annually. Yet this 
proposal was dismissed since it was considered impossible for one man to assume both these 
functions. It was also deemed more important for the president to be present in the Executive 
Council where mediation would be more important. In addition, doubts existed over whether 
the president should act as the chief administrator or should a separate office be created for 
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this task. The majority of the Informal Political Agenda Group preferred the creation of an 
additional ‘director-general’ but then questions were raised over whether this individual 
should be appointed by the president or be elected. If the second course was adopted, many 
State Department officials feared there might be a clash of authority between the two posts. 
Furthermore, during this period London made it clear it preferred the appointment of an 
impartial international civil servant – a role epitomized by the British first Secretary-General 
of the League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond. Paul Hasluck, an Australian diplomat who 
later represented his country in the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, also 
believed that, ‘the British had before their eyes the model of Sir Eric Drummond at the 
League of Nations and thought of the Secretary-General as a functionary for member states’.
7
 
Leon Gordenker explains this Anglo-American divergence was a result of the different 
governmental traditions of the two countries. The League’s model had clear parallels with the 
British notion of a civil service kept to the background. The Americans, in contrast, were 
more used to a government service headed by a powerful political official whose status 
equalled that of the legislature.
8
  
With the State Department thoroughly divided and British thinking moving in the 
opposite direction Roosevelt, at some point during the spring of 1944, dropped his moderator 
proposal seemingly agreeing that the disadvantages would outweigh whatever advantages he 
had originally seen.
9
 Consequently, the American Tentative Proposals produced for the 
upcoming Dumbarton Oaks conference simply outlined the election procedure for the 
director-general; stated that the he would act as the organisation’s chief administrative 
officer; and listed a number of purely administrative duties.
10
 Quite clearly the US 
Government was not prepared to propose any explicit political powers for the office before 
meeting with the other major powers to gauge their views. Within the State Department, 
nonetheless, consensus remained that the League model was unsatisfactory. At the same time, 
London’s attitude shifted. The British Tentative Proposals, in fact, went further than those 
produced by the State Department stating that, ‘The suggestion that the head of the 
Secretariat should be given the right of bringing before the World Council any matter which 
in his opinion threatens the peace of the world might well be incorporated into the rule of the 
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Organisation’.
11
 The USSR and China, in contrast, in their respective proposals made no 
mention of any political powers.
12
 Yet each of the four proposal papers did have one aspect in 
common. They all listed the Secretariat, and by inference its head, as one of the principal 
organs of the new international organisation. 
 
In the surprisingly few historical monographs focusing on the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 
such as the works by Robert Hilderbrand and Georg Schild,
13
 the conversations on the 
secretary-general’s character are completely absent. Furthermore, the memoirs of key figures 
involved at Dumbarton Oaks say virtually nothing on discussions on the role of the secretary-
general. Gladwyn Jebb, a member of the British delegation, only lists ‘the powers of the 
secretary-general’ as one of the ‘extraordinary’ agreements reached at the conference ‘in such 
a relatively short time’.
14
 In addition, the published diaries of the head of the British 
delegation, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
does not mention the issue at all.
15
 In many ways this omission does reflect reality since such 
discussions were extremely limited and overshadowed by other issues.
16
 Indeed, it was only 
on the fifteenth day of the conference that the secretary-general question was raised and, even 
then, there appeared to be an overwhelming degree of unanimity. The three delegates present 
– Cadogan, American Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius, , and Soviet Ambassador to 
the United States Andrei Gromyko – were all in agreement that the secretary-general should 
act as the chief administrative officer, chairing all meetings of the Security Council, General 
Assembly and Economic and Social Council, and producing an annual report on the work of 
the organization. Crucially, the three delegates also accepted the British suggestion that the 
secretary-general should be empowered to bring before the Security Council any matter he 
considered a threat to international peace and security. The Chinese delegate, Ambassador to 
the United Kingdom V. K. Wellington Koo – in separate talks with the American and British 
delegations since the USSR refused to participate in direct negotiations with China due to the 1941 
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Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty - also supported this provision although little attention was paid 
to China’s views. The only issue that caused even the slightest problem was the appointment 
procedure for the secretary-general. But the Americans, in the spirit of cooperation, accepted 
a Soviet proposal, backed by the British, that the Security Council should first decide on a 
candidate who would then be recommended to the General Assembly to cast its vote. In 
relation to this point, Jebb in his memoirs notes, ‘A unique feature of this [Dumbarton Oaks] 
conference was that it was the only one in which the Russians took part with hardly any 
apparent arrieres pensees and with an obviously sincere will to reach agreement’.
17
 
These provisions thus appeared as Chapter X in the Proposals for the Establishment of 
a General International Organization signed by the four delegations on 7 October 1944. 
Importantly, the Secretariat, headed by a ‘secretary-general’, was also listed in Chapter IV as 
one of the principal organs of the new organisation alongside the Security Council, General 
Assembly and an international court of justice.
18
 It is evident, therefore, that at Dumbarton 
Oaks general agreement existed that the secretary-general was to play some kind of political 
role in the central security function of the new organisation being created. But the four 
delegations, rushed for time and more concerned with other issues, kept the character of the 
secretary-general purposefully loose believing that details would be added when the rest of 
the Allied nations met to formally establish the UN.  
Significantly, however, at the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization that commenced in San Francisco in April 1945 questions concerning the 
secretary-general’s political powers were again pushed to the side-lines. This fact is again 
reflected in the lack of any mention of this issue in Jebb’s memoirs and Cadogan’s diaries – 
both members of the British delegation – as well as the memoirs of Escott Reid, a member of 
the Canadian delegation, and the papers of the South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts who 
headed his country’s delegation.
19
 In fact, the fifty nations present accepted without any 
notable opposition the provision granting the secretary-general the right to bring to the 
attention of the Security Council any matter he considered a threat to international peace and 
security. The general view, clearly, was that the secretary-general should be more proactive 
than his purely administrative League of Nation’s predecessor. Once more no serious 
discussions had taken place over what were the office’s political powers. Attention focused, 
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instead, on two other serious controversies related to the secretary-general: the election 
procedure for the office and whether deputies should be elected. Both of these issues created 
fissures within the Big Four, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. They 
also pitted the convening powers against a large number of smaller powers. Yet these matters 
were procedural and did not concern the fundamental character of the post.
20
 
Consequently, the secretary-general’s office, as laid out in Chapter XV of the UN 
Charter signed on 26 June 1945, at first glance appears to be essentially administrative in 
nature. In fact, Article 97 states, ‘He shall be the chief administrative officer of the 
Organization’. The only explicit expression of the secretary-general’s political character is 
Article 99, authorising the office-holder to bring to the attention of the Security Council any 
matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security. The implied political prerogatives stemming from this article, in effect, created 
within the secretary-general an office that could initiate examination, if not action, on matters 
of peace and security. This view was certainly held by Hasluck who later wrote, ‘I took the 
clear view as the Australian representative on the Committee of Experts that Article 99 of the 
Charter gave the Secretary-General a distinct and independent role’.
21
 In addition, Article 98 
makes it clear that the secretary-general could be granted additional powers on an ad hoc 
basis to fulfil specific functions by the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) and Trusteeship Council.
22
 
Furthermore, the secretary-general was granted other implicit powers in the UN 
Charter. To begin with, in Article 7 the Secretariat, headed by the secretary-general, is named 
as one of the UN’s principal organs alongside the General Assembly, Security Council, 
ECOSOC, and Trusteeship Council. As a result, the secretary-general’s office was distinctly 
independent and elevated above the administrative status accorded to it by the League of 
Nations.
23
 Moreover, the secretary-general was tacitly given co-responsibility with the 
principal organs to achieve the organisation’s purposes, including its principal aim in Article 
1.1 ‘to maintain international peace and security’. In practice, this clause effectively granted 
the secretary-general the power to act as a mediator to try to resolve problems when the other 
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principal organs – notably the Security Council – could not fulfil their specified tasks.
24
 This 
political role has come to be known as the secretary-general’s ‘good offices’.  
Yet at both Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco the UN founding fathers had proven 
themselves either unwilling or unable to establish detailed terms and conditions for the office 
of the secretary-general. As a consequence, Edward Luck has argued that if a major political 
role had been intended for the secretary-general then the office would have received far more 
attention at these formative sessions.
25
 But this view is too simplistic and does not consider 
the fact that very little discussion took place, and no major controversies arose, regarding the 
character of the secretary-general precisely because the great and small member states agreed 
that the office should contain the political powers discussed above. Given this level of 
unanimity, these states believed that these powers would be more fully articulated in time 
while it was more important to thrash out their differences on other issues at the two 
conferences.  
As a result, the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, established at the end 
of the San Francisco Conference to make provisional arrangements for the first session of the 
UN and establish the Secretariat, tried to fill in the details regarding the secretary-general’s 
role. Still, the discussions between the representatives of the fifty member states got bogged 
down in debates on the procedure for the secretary-general’s appointment and the type of 
person desired for the post.
26
Additionally, as the first General Assembly swiftly approached, 
discussions turned to individual candidates for the office. Lester Pearson, Canadian 
Ambassador to the United States at the time, recollects in his memoirs being suggested by the 
United States and Britain although he realised that the Soviet Union would not accept a North 
American candidate with American and British backing. Still, Pearson, while stressing that he 
was not disappointed, clearly indicates his view that the post had strong political powers 
when he writes, ‘I felt too that it was a position I could fill and one which would have given 
me an unrivalled opportunity to work for the things in which I believed; peace, security, and 
international cooperation’.
27
 In addition, Hasluck recalls that in the Preparatory Commission 
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it became clear that, ‘The Soviet Union seemed to want a Secretary-General who would serve 
their purposes or, if that were impossible, who would have no purpose of his own’.
28
 
Nevertheless, Chapter VIII, section 2, of the Report of the Preparatory Commission of 
the United Nations published on 23 December 1945, is very revealing when it comes to the 
powers intended for the secretary-general.
29
 This report states that the UN Charter assigned 
‘explicitly or by inference’ six principal functions for the secretary-general. The first four – 
general administrative and executive functions, technical functions, financial organization, 
and administration of the international Secretariat – fit comfortably within the purview of the 
‘chief administrative officer’ stipulated in Article 97. Yet political and representational 
functions were also included and three specifically political aspects of the position were 
outlined. Firstly, according to the Report, the secretary-general’s administrative decisions 
‘may justly be called political’ given their impact on the work of the organisation. Secondly, 
it describes Article 99 as, ‘a quite special right which goes beyond any power previously 
accorded to the head of an international organization’. Thirdly, it restates the Rooseveltian 
conception of the secretary-general, ‘as a mediator and as an informal adviser to many 
governments’. Moreover, the report discusses the secretary-general’s ‘moral authority’ 
prescribed in Article 100 which outlines the ‘international’ nature of his office and 
independence from any member state. Finally, the report argues that the secretary-general 
‘must embody the principles and ideals of the Charter’. 
By the end of 1945 a clearer sense of the character of the secretary-general had thus 
begun to emerge. Throughout the discussions over the previous two years, and specifically at 
the two wartime conferences at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, the general assumption 
had been that the office had a political as well as an administrative element to it. The 
secretary-general, therefore, was intended by the UN founding fathers to play a more active 
role in all aspects of the organisation’s work, including its security function, than its League 
of Nations’ predecessor. Even so, it remained unclear just how far the secretary-general was 
able to act in times of crisis, especially if the Security Council was prevented from 
performing its function due to differences between the permanent members. In consequence, 
the character of the secretary-general’s office was left to evolve during the tenure of its first 
incumbent.  
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UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie was nominated unanimously by the Security Council and 
elected by forty-six votes to three at the first session of the General Assembly on 29 January 
1946 as a compromise candidate.
30
 Crucially, Lie was favourably regarded in Moscow 
despite being, in Pearson’s words, ‘a strong man with no liking for communism’.
31
 
Nonetheless, Reid’s memoirs state that many key Western actors, such as US Undersecretary 
of State Dean Acheson and British Minister of State Philip Noel-Baker thought Lie was ‘not 
first-class’ and feared ‘he was not nearly quick enough or astute enough to tackle the work of 
secretary general’.
32
Still, the choice of the well-known Norwegian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs who had spent the Second World War working closely with the Allies in London, 
rather than a career civil servant, made it clear that the permanent members expected the 
secretary-general to play an important political role.
33
 Indeed, it was clear from that outset 
that Lie held liberal views of the political functions of his post, realising he had powers not 
enjoyed by his League of Nations predecessors. Lie thus believed that it was his duty to do all 
he could, ‘to uphold the [UN] Charter and to make the United Nations work as a force for 
peace’.
34
 James Muldoon argues convincingly that these expansive views were the result of 
an entwining of Lie’s personal values – developed throughout his upbringing in relative 
poverty and Lutheran education, his career as a trade unionist and socialist politician, and as 
Norwegian Foreign Minister-in-exile between 1940 and 1945 – and the norms of 
international law that the Charter imposed upon his office.
35
  
Lie consequently assumed an outspoken role as numerous post-war issues came 
before the UN, including Iran, Indonesia, Kashmir, Greece, Palestine, Berlin, China and East-
West relations. In consequence, during his first term, Lie established a number of important 
practices for the office of the secretary-general. This process had not been easy, though, since 
many of his initiatives had generated friction with the major powers, especially the United 
States.
36
 However, it was following the outbreak of the Korean War – the first time the UN 
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faced a breach of international peace and security that risked escalating into a global conflict  
– that Lie became most actively involved in the fulfilment of the UN’s principal security 
functions. Just before midnight on 24 June 1950 Lie was informed of the North Korean attack 
across the 38
th
 parallel by the US State Department.
37
 His immediate reaction was to request 
a report to clarify the situation from the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK), a body 
established two years earlier to oversee elections and bring about the peaceful unification of 
the peninsula.
38
 Lie also claims in his memoirs to have decided at that moment to summon 
the Security Council using his Article 99 powers.
39
 Yet at 3am US Ambassador Ernest Gross 
telephoned Lie to formally submit a request for an emergency session of the Security Council 
later that day.
40
 International lawyer and former judge of the International Court of Justice, 
Bruno Simma, therefore, argues persuasively that Lie could no longer invoke Article 99.
41
 
Still, Lie’s next action demonstrated that he was acting in the spirit of Article 99. He 
broke with tradition and opened the emergency Security Council meeting, delivering a 
passionate speech.
42
 He began by relaying the report just received from UNCOK concluding 
that North Korean forces had crossed the 38th parallel without provocation and indicated that 
a situation was developing which was assuming the character of a full-scale war and 
endangered the maintenance of international peace and stability.
43
 Lie went on to argue that it 
was the ‘clear duty’ of the Security Council to respond to this act of aggression.
44
  
As secretary-general, Lie was under no obligation to comment on UNCOK’s report 
but by doing so he put the full weight and prestige of his office behind the subsequent 
decisions taken by the Security Council.
45
 So why did Lie take this unprecedented initiative? 
Lie’s biographers James Barros and Anthony Gaglione argue that Lie acted under American 
pressure and to appease American public opinion.
46
 But Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote, 
two of Lie’s closest Secretariat advisers at the time, state that Lie felt obliged to take this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Test”: The UN Secretary-General and the Palestine Question, 1947-9’, The International History Review, 38, 1 
(2016), 196-213.  
37
 FRUS 1950 Volume VII: Korea (Washington, DC 1976), Editorial Note, 11:30 p.m., 24 June 1950, 127. 
38
 United Nations Archives and Records Management Service (UNARMS), S-0018-0009-01, Lie to UNCOK 
(Renborg), New York, 25 June 1950. 
39
 Lie, In the Cause of Peace, 328-9. 
40
 FRUS 1950 Vol. VII, Editorial Note, 3:00 a.m., 25 June 1950, 131. 
41
 B. Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford 1994), 1051-2. 
42
 United Nations Security Council Official Records Fifth year No. 15, 473rd Meeting, New York, 25 June 1950, 
1-15 
43
 UNARMS, S-0018-0008-08, Renborg to Lie, Seoul, 25 June 1950. 
44
 National Archives of Norway, PA-1407 Lie, Trygve, Box 4, Press Release SG/104, Statement by the 
Secretary-General at a Meeting of the Security Council, New York, 25 June 1950. 
45
 A. Cordier and W. Foote (eds), Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations – Volume I: 
Trygve Lie, 1946-1953 (New York, NY 1969), 20-1. 
46
 Barros, Trygve Lie and the Cold War, 274-5; Gaglione, The United Nations under Trygve Lie, 67. 
stand since in his mind the attack on South Korea – a country established by the UN only two 
years earlier – was akin to the Nazi invasion of Norway in 1940. Lie thus passionately 
believed that aggression had to be countered to prevent a slide into general war and to 
maintain the UN’s authority.
47
 Gross supports this position later recalling that during his 
telephone call with Lie early on 25 June 1950 the Secretary-General made it clear to him that 
the UN had to react or else it would go the way of the League of Nations.
48
 Furthermore, on 
30 July 1950 Lie told Pearson, now Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, that he 
had acted since, ‘there was no hope of peace being preserved unless the North Korean 
aggression could be contained and thrown back’. Lie, ‘now talking about the problem of 
preserving peace in terms that one might have expected from a signatory of the North 
Atlantic Pact rather than from the Secretary General of the United Nations’ also Pearson of 




It is difficult to judge, however, exactly how important Lie’s intervention was to the 
adoption of Security Council Resolution 82 identifying a breach of the peace and calling on 
North Korean forces to cease hostilities and withdraw to the 38
th
 parallel. The other 
permanent members present, as well as three of the non-permanent members, were allies of 
the United States and were keen to support Washington’s proposal. Yet Lie’s actions 
certainly helped to convince the Egyptian and Indian delegates to temporarily abandon 
neutrality and vote in the affirmative. In fact, only the Yugoslavian delegation failed to 
support the resolution, arguing that no decision should be taken until the facts became clearer. 
But Lie’s initiative would clearly have come to nothing if the Soviet Union had not been 
boycotting the Security Council over its decision six months earlier to continue recognising 
the Guomindang regime in Taipei, rather than Mao Zedong’s victorious Communists in 
Beijing, as the legitimate government of China. Moreover, it is hard to imagine the Secretary-
General putting his personal reputation and office on the line if a Soviet veto had been 
inevitable. 
Over the next forty-eight hours, nevertheless, it became clear that Pyongyang would 
not halt its military advance. Lie had no direct influence over the formulation or adoption of 
the US-sponsored Security Council Resolution 83 on 27 June 1950 which recommended that 
the UN members furnish assistance to South Korea to repel the armed attack and restore 
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international peace and security.
50
 Still, Lie believed that the terms of this resolution gave 
him executive powers to seek and receive offers of military assistance from the member 
states. Lie thus worked closely with the US delegation to draft a cable sent to all the members 
states requesting them to furnish him with ‘early information’ about ‘the type of help’ they 
could offer.
51
 Lie also attempted to influence events informally at this time. During a car 
journey returning from a function Lie asked Soviet Ambassador Jakov Malik to come with 
him to the UN Headquarters to take up the Soviet seat in the Security Council. Lie evidently 
believed that if the Soviet Union could be brought back to the Security Council then a 
solution to the Korean problem could be found. Malik, however, declined the offer and got 
out of the car.
52
 
Meanwhile, with the battlefield situation becoming dire Lie came to realize that some 
kind of machinery needed to be established to utilize the assistance rendered by the member 
states. He prepared, accordingly, a memorandum requesting that the US Government assume 
responsibility for directing the UN armed forces. This memorandum also recommended the 
creation of a Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea made up of the other 
contributing members.
53
 Lie’s ‘deeper purpose’ for his memorandum was to keep the UN ‘in 
the picture’ and prevent Washington completely dominating the collective security action.
54
 
Unsurprisingly, though, the Truman administration opposed outright the committee concept 
since it did not want to share responsibility with other states.
55
 Consequently, Lie dropped 
this proposal but the other aspects of his memorandum chimed well with American thinking 
and were largely incorporated into their third draft resolution. Security Council Resolution 
84, therefore, was adopted recommending that member states make contributions available to 
a unified command under the US Government.
56
  
This decision effectively marked the conclusion of the establishment of the UN’s first 
collective security action but Lie was not prepared to rest on his laurels. He worked closely 
with the US delegation to try to find a method to ensure that as many member states as 
                                                          
50
 United Nations Security Council Official Records Fifth Year No. 16, 474
th
 Meeting, New York, 27 June 1950, 3-
16. 
51
 FRUS 1950 Vol. VII, US Permanent Representative to the UN (Austin) to Secretary of State (Acheson), New 
York, 28 June 1950, 225. 
52
 Lie, In the Cause of Peace, 333. 
53
 FRUS 1950 Vol. VII, Memorandum of Conversation (Noyes), New York, 30 June 1950, 264-5. 
54
 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG84/350/82/4/2 E.1030-F, Box 24, Tel-Out 551d-
572d 6.28.50-7.1.50, Austin to Acheson, New York, 29 June 1950. 
55
 FRUS 1950 Vol. VII, Memorandum of Conversation (Ross), New York, 28 June 1950, 221–22; Acheson to 
Austin, Washington, DC, 4 July 1950, 299–301. 
56
 United Nations Security Council Official Records Fifth Year No. 18, 476
th




 Lie thus sent a note to all the members requesting offers of 
ground forces that he would then transmit to the US Government. Lie took this action since 
he felt members would more likely respond to requests from him than from Washington.
58
 
Many states, however, were annoyed with Lie’s note since they did not have forces available 
but felt embarrassed to give a negative response.
59
 London and Paris, in particular, were upset 
that they had not be consulted and complained to the Americans that Lie had over-stepped his 
authority.
60
A week later, in response to these reproaches, Lie told Pearson of his meeting 
with the US delegation at which it, ‘was put to him that the matter was one of the highest 
gravity and urgency, and that effective Congressional and political support of the United 
Nations would be put in jeopardy if United States military action in opposing aggression 
appeared to be isolated an unsupported by other members of the United Nations’. Lie had 
thus agreed that the appeal for ground forces would be more effective coming from him but 
he was given to understand that the US delegation would inform other members of the 
reasons behind the initiative being done in this way. Lie was, therefore, disappointed that he 
had gone ‘ahead with his share of the arrangement…and taken a good deal of bruising’ while 
the US delegation had not taken ‘any of the complementary actions’.
61
 
The Secretary-General, while unperturbed by the criticism he received, was, however, 
deeply disappointed with the few positive replies sent and the token offers made. All the 
same, Lie suggested making use of volunteers – especially from smaller countries that could 
not spare their own forces – and forming international brigades under American command. 
The Truman administration, however, shunned this idea since it would require special 
Congressional legislation which would prove controversial. Lie, therefore, did not push this 
proposal.
62
 Even so, by early August 1950 fifteen member states had made military 
contributions giving the force something of a UN flavour. Yet over ninety percent of the 
troops were American. Also, these states contributed forces mainly to build closer ties with 
Washington. Still, Lie’s public requests and his persistence helped pile pressure on members 
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and facilitated their offers, particularly from states such as Canada and France who had 
shown little enthusiasm beforehand.
63
 
Over the next month Lie remained quiet since nothing could be done while UN forces 
fought desperately to retain a position in Korea. But activity in New York was reinvigorated 
in mid-September 1950 following the UN Command’s daring amphibious landings at Inchon. 
Almost immediately the course of the war shifted in favour of the UN and by the end of the 
month North Korea had been forced back to the 38
th
 parallel. With military victory imminent 
the General Assembly considered how the UN could achieve its long-standing political 
objective of unifying Korea. Lie was determined to voice his opinion on this matter and 
drafted a working paper entitled Suggested Terms of Settlement of the Korean Question. This 
proposal promoted an immediate cease-fire at the 38
th
 parallel followed by the 
demilitarization of North Korea. UNCOK and UN relief personnel would then enter the north 
and lay the necessary foundations for free elections throughout Korea to establish a new 
national government. If Pyongyang refused these terms UN forces would cross the 38
th
 
parallel and occupy North Korea until elections could be held.
64
 
The US delegation to the General Assembly, however, had other ideas in mind. The 
Americans agreed that all-Korea elections should be held and for this purpose proposed the 
creation of a UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) to 
supersede UNCOK. But the Truman administration, buoyant after the military successes in 
Korea, insisted that UNCURK could only be effective if UN forces were first permitted to 
cross the 38th parallel and reunify the country.
65
 A draft resolution embodying these 
principles was thus produced and was overwhelmingly adopted despite Indian warnings that 
China would intervene if UN forces crossed the 38
th
 parallel. Clearly, Lie’s efforts had been 
ignored. It is interesting to note, though, that Lie had not pushed his suggestions with much 
vigour since, with victory seemingly in sight, he shared Washington’s hubris.
66
  
In the meantime, the Soviet delegation had returned to take up its seat at the UN. 
While attacking the collective security action in Korea in general, Moscow focused specific 
criticism on Lie, claiming he had acted beyond the powers granted him as secretary-general. 
Furthermore, Lie was accused of collaborating with Washington and abetting in the decisions 
which authorized American aggression in Korea. In October 1950, therefore, with Lie’s five-
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year tenure as secretary-general due to expire, the Soviet government sought to prevent him 
being re-elected. Yet Lie’s stand on Korea had gained him American support and the Truman 
administration was determined to prevent him being forced out by Moscow. Importantly, Lie 
agreed, if somewhat reluctantly, that he should stay on as secretary-general to prevent a 
Soviet victory that would inevitably curtail the powers of his successors.
67
 The Security 
Council, in consequence, became deadlocked since the Soviet delegation vetoed Lie’s 
candidacy while the Americans refused to accept anyone else. In a blatant evasion of Charter 
procedure the matter was eventually taken up by the General Assembly where it was 
recommended that Lie continue in his post for three more years.
68
 This decision did 
temporarily resolve the issue although Moscow thereafter refused to recognize Lie as 
secretary-general.  
The question remains whether the Soviet arguments had any merit. His proactive 
stance certainly went far beyond the actions of a chief administrator and anything he had 
done before. But, as was established above, the UN founding fathers had intended far-
reaching political powers for the office of secretary-general. Lie may have been denied the 
opportunity of employing Article 99 but his subsequent decisions to ask for the report from 
UNCOK and to support the case for action in the Security Council were well within the 
prerogatives inferred in this provision. In addition, Lie’s efforts to ensure that the military 
force being created had a genuine UN composition demonstrated his desire to act alongside 
the Security Council in achieving the UN’s primary purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security. The Secretary-General was thus fulfilling the political role assigned to 
him as one of the UN’s principal organs. 
Yet the Soviet criticism of Lie’s relationship with the United States does have some 
validity. In fact, Barros goes as far as to claim that Lie was a ‘lackey of the Western camp’.
69
 
Nonetheless, while Lie clearly did work extremely closely with the US delegation throughout 
the first months of the Korean War, he did not receive instructions from Washington and was 
not in breach of Article 100 of the UN Charter. His relationship with the US delegation was 
inevitably close since his personal convictions were very similar to those of the Truman 
administration. What is more, only Washington was willing to take the lead in the Security 
Council and in sending forces to Korea. Lie consequently had little choice but to act with the 
Americans to fulfil the UN’s objectives. Disagreements also did exist between Lie and the 
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US delegation. Invariably in such instances Lie backed down but this did not demonstrate 
that he was an American puppet. It merely reflected the fact that the secretary-general’s 
powers are purely advisory.   
 
The second stage of the Korean War commenced with the arrival of Chinese forces in late 
October 1950. Initially, it appeared only a few thousand Chinese soldiers had crossed the 
border. But in late November Beijing launched a massive offensive forcing the UN 
Command to retreat. At this point the General Assembly took up the Korean question at the 
United States’ request. This course was made possible by the adoption on 3 November 1950 
of General Assembly Resolution 377, commonly known as the Uniting for Peace Resolution. 
This wide-ranging resolution was proposed by the US delegation, without any notable input 
from Lie, and included the provision that if the Security Council failed to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security due to a lack of 
unanimity among the permanent members, the General Assembly would immediately 
consider the matter and make recommendations.
70
 Still, in New York grave fears quickly 
emerged over what action the United States would take and whether this might lead to the 
Korean War escalating into a global conflict. In this crisis – the most serious of the early Cold 
War period – Lie was not prepared to stand back. His ability to act, however, was now 
severely constrained by the enmity of the Soviet Union. As a result, Lie sought to use his 
good offices, the one power left at his disposal, to mediate a ceasefire and end the fighting.
71
  
To achieve his goal Lie met on nine occasions with General Wu Hsiu-chan, a Chinese 
representative present in New York to discuss the future of Taiwan. At first Wu ignored Lie’s 
urgings for China to withdraw its forces from Korea.
72
 But at their fourth meeting Wu hinted 
that his government wanted peace and would appreciate Lie’s help ascertaining the ceasefire 
conditions of the UN Command.
73
 What is more, Wu indicated that he preferred to discuss 
such matters with Lie than the Cease-fire Committee – composed of the Iranian President of 
the General Assembly, Nasrollah Entezam, Pearson of Canada, and Indian Permanent 
Representatives Sir Benegal Rau – appointed by the General Assembly.
74
 Nevertheless, Lie 
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kept the Cease-fire Committee fully informed of his ‘tough’ and ‘depressing’ discussions 
with Wu as is demonstrated by Pearson’s diary.
75
  
The Chinese offensive in Korea, meanwhile, had halted at the 38
th
 parallel indicating 
Beijing had achieved its objectives. Lie thus interpreted these developments as a direct 
challenge to him to act as a mediator.
76
Nonetheless, when Lie probed further the talks with 
Wu quickly broke down. Wu refused to accept that the Chinese forces fighting in Korea were 
anything more than ‘volunteers’ and stressed that the UN should negotiate with the North 
Korean authorities. To make matters worse, Wu stated that Beijing would only negotiate if it 
was first agreed that the PRC would be admitted to the UN; Taiwan would come under its 
sovereignty; all foreign forces would be withdrawn from Korea; and American aggression in 
East Asia would cease.
77
 Wu then revealed that he had been instructed to depart New York. 
Despite these clear signals, Lie tried to convince Wu to stay and stressed that he continued to 
be available to mediate in the future. According to Pearson’s diary Lie, ‘told them that they 
were in danger of precipitating war if they broke off like this, because it would be interpreted 
here that the Chinese Communist Government had no interest in bringing the war in Korea to 
an end’. Lie also urged the Chinese delegation to meet with the Cease-fire Committee but 
they refused to do so indicating that ‘these great matters of peace and war’ could only be 
decided at a meeting of Mao, Stalin and Truman.
78
 But behind-the-scenes Lie had given up 
hope convinced that the Chinese delegation was taking orders from Moscow. He told Pearson 
the Cease-fire Committee should now admit failure and the question of what action should be 
taken against the Chinese could then be referred to the Collective Measures Committee set up 
in the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
79
 At the same time, Lie encouraged the US delegation to 
press on with its draft resolution demanding the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea.
80
  
Lie was undoubtedly deeply frustrated with his failed attempt to mediate a ceasefire 
with Wu.
81
 Yet in the circumstances the odds were heavily stacked against him. Not only had 
he become persona non grata with the Soviet Union, the likelihood of Beijing negotiating a 
ceasefire while its forces in Korea were humiliating the UN Command was extremely 
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limited.
82
 Similarly, even if Wu had been willing to talk, Washington was in no mood to 
make compromises with domestic and international opinion shifting against the United 
States. It is interesting to note, though, that Lie’s attempts to use his good offices were largely 
accepted without protest. Why, then, did these actions create far less controversy than Lie’s 
role during the first few months of the Korean War? 
To begin with, the concept of the secretary-general acting as a mediator had existed 
since the earliest wartime discussions and featured most prominently in Roosevelt’s 
moderator proposal. This idea may not have been discussed in any detail at Dumbarton Oaks 
or San Francisco. But it is implied by the fact the secretary-general is one of the principal 
organs of the UN and shares equal responsibility to uphold the aims and principles of the 
organisation. In addition, the 1945 Preparatory Commission’s report plainly describes the 
secretary-general as ‘a mediator’. Furthermore, Lie’s efforts to negotiate with Wu were quite 
clearly not undertaken at the behest of Washington and the proposals he made were his own. 
In fact, the US delegation did not encourage Lie’s endeavours since the Truman 
administration remained ambiguous over whether it desired an end to the fighting at all. For 
the US government it was essential to first have China branded an aggressor. Lie could thus 
hardly be accused by the Soviets of partiality. 
 
After Wu’s departure from New York the Chinese offensive was renewed on New Year’s 
Eve. Then on 1 February 1951, with UN forces retreating south of the 38
th
 parallel, the 
United States successfully pushed for the PRC to be branded an aggressor by the General 
Assembly.
83
 Yet no escalatory measures were taken by Washington and the military situation 
slowly began to improve. By late spring the UN Command had pushed the Communist 
armies back to the status quo ante bellum. Lie – who had been largely absent as these military 
events unfolded – thus concluded that the time was again ripe to exercise his political powers 
and attempt to facilitate a ceasefire.  
To achieve these ends in June 1951 Lie circulated a memorandum, entitled Ideas 
Concerning Attainment of a Cease-fire in Korea, proposing the field commanders negotiate a 
strictly military armistice without any political preconditions.
84
 While this proposal met 
considerable interest, the US delegation argued that it was untimely since the military 
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situation in Korea remained uncertain. Lie reacted strongly to this accusing the Truman 
administration of being ‘in a coma’ since the decline in public support for the war.
85
 Lie did 
convince Washington, nevertheless, that a further request by him for ground troops might 




It is easy to see, therefore, why Lie in his memoirs claims credit for Malik’s statement 
made the following day on the UN radio programme ‘Price of Peace’ in which the Soviet 
Ambassador essentially accepted his proposal for purely military negotiations.
87
 This opening 
was then swiftly seized upon by Washington and armistice negotiations got underway 
between the military commanders in Korea on 11 July 1951. Lie, however, undoubtedly 
exaggerates the importance of his role since the US and Soviet governments had been 
working toward this goal for two months. Even so, prior to Lie’s intervention both sides had 
struggled to find a breakthrough since neither wished to appear to be suing for peace. In the 
tense climate of the early Cold War, in which prestige was so important, Lie’s memorandum 
established a procedure that both sides could accept without losing face.  
Interestingly, Lie’s role in facilitating the ceasefire negotiations induced far less 
criticism than his actions at the start of the conflict. Evidently, Moscow was willing to accept 
Lie’s meddling if he was clearly acting within the political parameters originally intended for 
the secretary-general’s office. Indeed, Lie’s memorandum was a subtle method of mediation 
between the two superpowers helping them to achieve something they both desired. Few 
could argue that he had overstepped what was expected of him or that he was acting for the 
benefit of any one state or group of states. Moreover, with the truce talks now underway Lie 
believed that he had finally achieved his primary objective since China had intervened in 
Korea. As a result, he accepted there was little more he could do and willingly left the 
negotiations in American hands, confident the fighting would soon end.
88
 
The opening of the armistice negotiations marked Lie’s final significant contribution 
regarding Korea. Over the next year he became increasingly frustrated when the truce talks 
broke down and came to regret his decision to remain in office since the Soviet boycott 
curtailed his activities to a small part of the political role intended for the secretary-general.
89
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Consequently, Lie resigned on 10 November 1952, less than two years into his extended term 
stressing that with the Korean ceasefire talks nearing completion, a new secretary-general 
who was the unanimous choice of the big powers would help the UN to save the peace.
90
  
Still, it proved extremely difficult to find a replacement acceptable to the permanent 
members. Pearson, whom Lie had submitted his resignation to as the current President of the 
General Assembly and who was Lie’s choice to replace him, believed that, if it was 
impossible to find a successor, Lie might have been persuaded to remain in office. In fact, 
when the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrey Vyshinsky made it abundantly clear 
that Pearson’s candidature was unacceptable Lie telephoned Pearson, ‘to congratulate me on 
joining him as an object of a Russian veto and…he seemed to me to rather relish the prospect 
of now being begged to stay on’.
91
 Yet Jebb understood that this ‘position was both irregular 
and rather unsatisfactory’ and since ‘a Scandinavian had, in principle, a better chance than 
most of being acceptable to all, we might think of Dag Hammarskjold…whose record, I 




Jebb’s assumptions proved correct and on 7 April 1953Hammarskjold, a relatively 
unknown Swedish diplomat, was elected as a compromise candidate.
93
 Hammarskjold, who 
himself later joked that his name was ‘picked out of a hat’,
94
 crucially, was perceived as 
being apolitical and someone who would not test the political powers of his office as his 
predecessor had done. In fact, Urquhart writes that Lie opposed Hammarskjold’s appointment 
precisely for this reason believing that the Swede ‘would be no more than a clerk’.
95
 And 
these views initially appeared to be borne out since during the final months of fighting in 
Korea before the Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953 Hammarskjold kept a low profile. 
 
Trygve Lie’s tenure, therefore, ended with the apparent acceptance by both Cold War camps 
that it was desirable that the office of secretary-general be essentially administrative in 
character. Yet it was the principal states represented at Dumbarton Oaks that had abandoned 
their original positions regarding the political role of the secretary-general rather than Lie 
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acting beyond the powers consistently envisaged for his office between 1943 and 1945. Many 
of Lie’s actions in helping to shape the UN’s response to the Korea crisis were certainly 
without precedent given the reasonably short history of the world organisation. But, as has 
been demonstrated, in each case Lie’s actions can be connected back to the wartime 
discussions on the secretary-general and the powers granted to this office either explicitly or 
implicitly in the UN Charter. In spite of the fact they said so little regarding their intentions 
for this post, the UN’s founding fathers would not have been surprised or appalled by Lie’s 
actions during the Korean War. From the outset the Big Four – and later the smaller powers – 
all appeared to be in agreement that the secretary-general, as head of the Secretariat, should 
act as one of the UN’s principal organs and thus had an equal role to play alongside the 
Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Trusteeship Council in fulfilling the 
organisation’s aims and purposes. Furthermore, the delegates at Dumbarton Oaks and San 
Francisco granted the secretary-general a very specific security function by authorising him 
to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which he believed threatened 
international peace and security. Quite clearly the secretary-general was never intended to be 
solely the UN’s chief administrator even though his powers had not been fully articulated. 
 So why then did Lie’s proactive stance during the Korean War create so much 
controversy? To begin with, the atmosphere of cooperation present during the Second World 
War had long since evaporated by 1950. In these circumstances, Stalin refused to consider 
Lie’s actions in terms of the UN Charter and instead viewed him through Cold War lenses. 
The Secretary-General was thus seen to be siding with the United States against the Soviet 
Union. In turn, Washington attempted to use Lie as a pawn to legitimize its policy at the UN 
and to antagonize Moscow. Lie also abetted in his own downfall. Not only did he fail to 
realize how some of his actions could be misconstrued as partiality towards the Americans, 
his public and often confrontational style antagonized many member states who thought that 
the secretary-general should be a strictly behind-the-scenes operator. Once the dust had 
settled on the Korean War, nonetheless, Dag Hammarskjold followed many of the practices 
established by his predecessor, testing even further the parameters of the political powers 
granted to him. Undoubtedly, therefore, Lie’s actions in 1950-1 were instrumental in 
fleshing-out the office of the secretary-general into something close to what had been 
intended by the UN’s founders over half a decade earlier and what exists today. Hasluck’s 
final analysis of Lie, therefore, still rings true: ‘The role of the Secretary-General was shaped 
by Lie and his successors owed much to the way he shaped it…Lie may have been clumsy 
sometimes in the way he handled a situation but he did establish that the Secretary-General 
had his own part to play in an international situation and was not a puppet’.
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